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The new governance of social security in Britain1
 
Emma Carmel & Theodoros Papadopoulos2
 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter explores the objectives and organisation of social security policy 
making under the Labour government since 1997. Using the concept of 
‘governance’ as a framework, the chapter explores recent policy 
developments in two areas. The first concerns the government's policy goals 
and the key principles underpinning them. These include the construction of 
social security as support rather than protection; the conflation of security 
with work; the reconfiguration of rights and responsibilities; the emphasis on 
contractualisation and monitoring behaviour; and the pursuit of 'selective 
universalism'. The second area concerns the operational side of social security 
policy making and especially the ways in which the organisation and 
management of policy delivery has altered. This includes the creation of the 
new Department and Agencies, and the ways in which the Treasury 
increasingly exerts control of these through the use of 'quasi-contracts', 
operational targets, performance management, as well as the dominance of 
the business model in operational discourse.  
 
Introduction 
On June 8th 2001, the day of New Labour's second election victory, the Department 
for Social Security (DSS) was 'transformed' into Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP). Replacing the DSS, a Department that existed in one form or the other for 
almost a generation, the new DWP comprises parts of the former DSS, parts of the 
Department for Education and Employment, and two new agencies, the Job Centre 
Plus and the Pensions Service. Other parts of the former DSS are now under the 
competence of the Treasury and the Ministry of Defence. This extensive institutional 
reorganisation and its symbolic manifestation in the removal of the words 'social 
security' from the title of the new Department are the starting points for this chapter's 
reflections on the changing governance of social security in Britain. It is argued that 
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these changes were neither merely administrative nor procedural, but that they 
symbolically marked key shifts in the objectives, logic and organisation of social 
security policymaking. As such this chapter offers both a general introduction to 
what these changes have been, and also an initial evaluation of their significance.  
 
In order to do this, we apply the concept of governance to the case of social security 
policy in Britain. The term 'governance' is here used to describe a form of political 
regulation of social subjects - i.e. individuals, social groups or institutions - initiated, 
organised and partially controlled by an actor or actors vested with the political 
authority to act in an area of public policy. Governance involves the 'steering' of the 
subjects' behavioural practices towards particular social and politico-economic goals 
via a set of institutions and processes that aim to maintain or change the status quo.  
 
The concept of governance thus enables us to focus on a crucial feature of 
government policymaking: that government is not only about legislation and rule 
creation, but it is also about 'how government is to be done' (Culpitt 1999: 44). It thus 
facilitates an analysis of policymaking in two distinct but clearly related domains. 
The first concerns the content of policy, the legislation and regulations that embody 
policy principles, objectives and intended outputs, which we will refer to as 'formal' 
policy. The second concerns the 'mode of doing policy'; the organisational 
arrangements and procedures for policy delivery, referred to here as operational 
policy. The analytical power of the concept of governance is that it allows enough 
flexibility to separately analyse both formal and operational policy while 
simultaneously highlighting their unity. This unity concerns policy means and ends. 
The means (operational policy) are inexorably connected to the ends ('formal' 
policy); the 'how' of doing policy affects the 'what' of 'formal' policy and vice versa.  
 
Furthermore, both the 'how' and the 'what' of social security policy involve the 
regulation of categories of welfare subjects. Indeed, the latter are inseparable from, 
and are reproduced by, the very institutions, regulations and procedures of which 
they are the focus. The formation of these categories is also inseparable from the 
discourse that produces them. Thus, for example, the constitution of a person through 
public policy as a citizen or as a consumer, as a 'jobseeker' or as unemployed, 
depends on the discourse through which 'formal' policy is expressed and made sense 
of, a discourse that encapsulates a particular vision of how the social world is and 
should be. In our view, governance is immersed in discourse; forms of governance 
involve the institutional crystallisation of particular discourses. For this reason, our 
analysis of social security governance in Britain includes an examination of the ways 
in which categories such as the above are formed through official discourse. 
 
Governance in the 'formal' policy domain of social security 
This section analyses the key principles guiding the Labour government's social 
security policies as well as the socio-economic goals that underpin them. Our aim 
here is not to provide a definitive analysis examining the detail of policy 
developments; other chapters in this book offer these. Rather, the section provides a 
general overview of the normative contours of social security governance so that its 
logic as a new form of political regulation can be clearly identified. 
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Social security as support  
The term 'social security' as applied to state income maintenance programmes first 
appeared in the US in 1934 to describe the instigation of the Roosevelt 
administration's 'New Deal'. Originally entitled the Economic Security Act, 
Roosevelt's Social Security Act was justified as a 'safeguard' against the 'man (sic) - 
made' contingencies of market failures, evident in the mass unemployment of the 
Depression years (Box 3.1). In this original vision of social security - which after the 
war found an even bolder expression in the constitution of UN's International Labour 
Organisation (see quote Box 3.1) - society was understood to require protection by 
the state in response to circumstances explicitly considered to be socio-economic. 
Thus, underlying this form of social security governance was the principle that state 
should provide protection - not merely support - to individuals, from socio-economic 
situations for which they were not individually to blame and which were perceived to 
be amenable to state action.  
 
A similar vision also underpinned Beveridge's position. He viewed the contributory 
principle - benefits paid out in return for previous contributions - as an essential part 
of a system in which social security was predominantly to be provided as of right, 
rather than according to need. This was a right to protection against the contingencies 
that affect labour market participation (McKay and Rowlingson, 1999: 60-3). 
Although it was not meant to 'guarantee a standard of life beyond subsistence level, 
[for] men whose powers of earning diminish must adjust themselves to that change', 
this right nevertheless was to be accompanied by 'full use of powers of the state to 
maintain employment and to reduce unemployment' (Beveridge, 1941, quoted in 
Fraser, 1984: 288).  
 
[insert box 3.1 about here] 
 
When those original visions for social security are compared to the ones held by 
British governments at the end of the 20th century, also summarised in Box 3.1, a 
number of differences emerge. One of them concerns the role of benefits. The new 
consensus is that they should not provide protection but, rather, support. The crucial 
difference between these two conceptualisations of security - protection versus 
support - can be illustrated by considering an example of how the term is used in 
other contexts. For instance, when a private company offers security to a person 
whose life is threatened, this is clearly meant to be protection from harm, not support 
once the harm is done. Social security-as-support is a 'hollowed out' security; its 
essence - protection - has been changed. In this vision, social security is not primarily 
about protection from failures of socio-economic conditions and processes that state 
action can alter. Rather, it is a 'helping hand' so that an individual can alter his/her 
own behaviour to match the demands arising from these conditions and processes. 
Indeed, in this paternalistic vision of 'hollowed-out security', the emphasis on 'help 
for self-help' implies that benefit recipients are themselves to a large degree 
responsible for their status; with some (conditional) help, they will be able to end 
their status as benefit claimants.  
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For the Labour government, the Beveridge-inspired post-war settlement in social 
security policy, with its subsequent modifications and its curtailments during the 
years of conservative rule, has run its historical course (DSS 1998a; and Chapter one 
here). There were at least two clear objectives that the first Labour government 
elected in 1997 had in respect of the social security system. The first was to make 
(re)employment the central feature of provision for people of working age. The 
second was to 'modernise' social security to meet this goal, although the means to 
deliver it was the focal point of competing visions and discourses. Framed in this 
way, the normative assumptions of New Labour's social security governance 
represented a clear departure from traditional Labour Party principles of 'extensive 
and progressive redistribution […] without recourse to means-testing' (Brewer et al, 
2002: 3). In 'thinking the unthinkable' - to use the catch phrase of this period - some 
policies were clearly crossed off the list of 'unthinkable' options.  
 
Two competing visions of the principles on the basis of which social security was to 
be 'modernised' can be found in the debates at that time (Brewer et al, 2002: 3-5, 14-
5; Timmins, 2001: 559ff). One vision, expressed by Frank Field, then Minister for 
Welfare Reform in the DSS, emphasised the need to provide benefits through social 
insurance, that is, on the basis of the contributory principle. This was necessary in 
order to overcome the morally debilitating, and economic disincentive effects of 
means-tested benefits, which had increased in importance over the post-war period, 
and which discouraged people from taking responsibility for securing their own 
income. For Field, linking benefits to contributions was the means to promote 
individuals' engagement in paid work as well as independence. It would also, 
especially for pensioners, maintain the idea that access to social security was a right. 
 
The alternative vision, favoured by the Treasury, questioned Field's emphasis on 
social insurance, and emphasised outcomes. As Alastair Darling (who became 
Secretary of State at the DSS from the Treasury in 1998 after the post of 'Minister for 
Welfare Reform' was abolished and Frank Field left the Department) argued: 'the 
important difference in social security is not whether [benefits] are insurance based 
or means-tested but whether or not they provide enough help to get people back to 
work and improve their lives' (quoted in Brewer et al, 2002: 4, see also DSS, 2000b: 
para. 6; para. 25, and introduction, para. 2). This vision was eventually adopted as 
the government's policy. 
 
A new configuration of rights and responsibilities 
Despite the above claim and the government's assurance that the abolition of 
contributory benefits is not on the agenda yet (DSS, 2000b: para.8), there has been a 
further erosion of contributory benefits and an expansion in means-testing. A 
contributory system is a 'something-for-something' deal between the state and the 
individual where (to use New Labour speak) the right to protection is gained through 
the previous exercise of responsibility. As the Labour government is supposedly 
committed to end the 'something for nothing' welfare culture then, logically, one 
should have expected that it would have strengthened not weakened the contributory 
principle. This, however, is contrary to the observed trend of expanding means-tested 
benefits. How can this paradox be explained?  
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One way to make sense of these developments is to view them as indicative of a 
reconfiguration of the contract between the state and the citizen. In a contributory 
system, establishing the right to protection is the end result of a process during which 
the claimant via his/her contributions 'demonstrates' his/her responsible behaviour. 
Conditions are mainly attached before the claim is made and the right of the state to 
'steer' and monitor the claimant's behaviour after the claim is made is rather weak. 
Having fulfilled his/her obligations vis-à-vis contributions, the right of the claimant 
to protection is strengthened. Conversely, in the new arrangements, the claim for 
support marks the beginning of a different process whereby conditions are attached 
after the claim is made. What is strengthened here is the 'right' of the state to 'steer' 
and monitor claimant's behaviour after the claim is made. In this context, the Labour 
government’s social security policy marks a new distribution of rights and 
responsibilities between the state and the individual where security is seen as support 
not a right, whereby the state establishes its right to demand behavioural changes 
from the claimant in return for providing him/her with support. The 'new contract for 
welfare', as the government's Green Paper on welfare reform was called, was 
precisely that. 
 
Work as security 
Very different from the original visions of social security, and probably the most 
significant normative attribute in New Labour's vision, is the apparent equivalence 
drawn between work and security. For a working age person there is no clear or 
explicit right to security. Instead paid work is seen as replacing security. However, 
this paid work is itself not secure. It is neither guaranteed by the state nor is 
significantly 'protected' when one is in work, notwithstanding the introduction of the 
national minimum wage. Also, its narrow definition as paid work in a labour market 
underlines an exclusionary vision. Important welfare-creating activities that are not 
part of the cash/market nexus and thus are not 'registered' as productive are absent 
from such definition (Levitas 1998; Lund, 2000: 202-3)- two obvious examples here 
being care-work or voluntary work (see Chapter 6 here). Further, work seen in this 
way potentially enhances the social differences between able-bodied and disabled-
bodied people of working age, and echoes a rather narrow vision of social life - we 
do not work to live but rather live to work.  
 
Alongside this, there has been a retreat from the principle that the state should ensure 
full employment; that is, from the idea that security should primarily to be created 
through the provision of jobs (for men). As indicated in the 1944 White Paper on 
Employment, full employment meant the state had a responsibility 'to maintain a 
high and stable level of employment' (Digby 1989: 58). This approach is markedly 
different from the New Labour approach of 'work for those who can'. Under the 
recent redefinition of full employment as 'full employability' (e.g. Department for 
Work and Pensions and HM Treasury 2001), the reason for unemployment is now 
firmly anchored to an individual's capacities and capabilities, implying that they 
themselves are responsible for their employment status. The state's responsibilities 
are to provide only opportunities for training and skills development, which the risk-
taking individual is required to take up. Thus the entire construct of opportunity and 
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employability evident in the government's discourse involves a 'privatisation of risk 
management' (Rose 1996b: 58) and the 'management of insecurity' (Dean and Shah, 
2002). The individual of working age is made responsible for their employment 
status, and for the provision of their own security, including in old age. 
 
Thus New Labour's vision of 'security' for people of working age is the further 
expansion of individual labour supply in a 'flexible' and insecure labour market. 
Social security policies are no longer a means to protect society from potential 
failures of a market economy, nor a means to 'steer' the economy to respond and 
meet social needs. Rather, they are to become a means to 'steer' the behaviour of 
individuals to make them adaptable to what are perceived by the government as the 
demands of this market economy (Grover and Stewart, 1999). If this trend continues, 
‘social security’ runs the risk of becoming nothing more than an 'obligation to 
endlessly manufacture a future where one is not a drain on the entrepreneurial 
activities of others' (Fitzpatrick: 2002: 15). 
 
Contractualisation and behavioural monitoring 
Although the previous Conservative governments introduced some compulsory 
interviews for unemployed claimants, under the Labour government this process has 
gone much further (see Chapter 5 here). The New Deal established in Labour's first 
term, either required or encouraged different groups of 'working age' claimants to 
attend interviews, training or take up employment. The separate New Deals for 
young people, lone parents, the long-term unemployed, older unemployed people, 
the partners of long-term unemployed and for people with disabilities each had 
different conditions in respect of benefit entitlement. Thus only the New Deals for 
young people and the long-term unemployed aged between 25 and 50 were made 
compulsory, with sanctions for non-compliance with the scheme. This variety of 
conditions implied that although ideally all people of working age should take up 
employment, there some people for whom this could be made into requirement.  
 
This process appears to have accelerated recently. There have been extensions to the 
group characterised as required to consider employment, heralded in the introduction 
of a re-structured New Deal for the over 25s, and the requirement from April 2003 
for all lone parents to attend work-focused interviews, irrespective of the age of their 
children. All new claimants for benefits are, in the 'Jobcentre Plus' organisation, 
required to attend such an interview at the time of their first claim (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2001b: 3-4)3, adopting the approach taken with the ONE 
gateway that acted as the pilot scheme to the introduction of Jobcentre Plus (Osgood 
et al 2002).  
 
This could indicate a re-constitution of welfare subjects even more explicitly through 
their age/labour market status, in which claimants are dealt with in a similar 'work-
focused way' regardless of the reason for their benefit claim. The underlying 
principle is clear. A contract is to be established between these groups of working 
3 There are two exceptions to this regulation: Maternity Allowance and Industrial Injuries benefit 
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age and the state, whereby the state had the right to insist on particular kinds of 
labour market behaviour in exchange for providing benefits (Heron and Dwyer 
1999).4  
 
Selective universalism 
As should by now be clear, the key way in which welfare subjects are constituted in 
Labour's social security policies is through their relationship to potential labour 
market status. Thus there are children (below working age); working age people; and 
pensioners. The distribution of rights, responsibilities and risks in social security 
varies according to this age/labour market status categorisation. Thus 'the welfare 
system should support a number of objectives: delivering work for those who can, 
helping those who need it most - families with children and the poorest pensioners' 
(DSS, 2000b, para. 9). In clarifying the phrase 'security for those who cannot', (poor) 
pensioners and families with children are treated as special cases because they are 
perceived as 'unable to affect their own incomes through work (...) By contrast work 
could still be viewed as the best form of welfare for most working-age adults' 
(Brewer et al, 2002: 7). Future pensioners are expected and are being encouraged to 
save and invest for their retirement (DWP, 2002; DSS 1998a), a development 
towards what Hewitt (2002) calls 'assets based welfare'.  
 
This strategy of 'selective universalism' (see Timmins, 2001: 574), indicates that the 
government is not committed to poverty alleviation in general nor to income 
redistribution across the board. Rather, its commitment is to poverty alleviation for 
particular socio-demographic groups, while its agenda for redistribution is more 
'about the distance between the bottom of the income distribution and the middle, but 
not between the middle and the top' (Brewer et al 2002).  
 
To conclude this section, in the normative vision of New Labour's social security 
governance, security is redefined as support, and work as employability. At the same 
time, contractualisation and monitoring of claimants’ behaviour enforces a new 
distribution of rights, responsibilities and risks. This approach is anchored in a 
productivist logic, in which the main task of government is to create the conditions 
for economic competitiveness in an internationalised market economy (Jessop, 1999; 
Grover and Stewart, 1999). Being now subordinate to this goal, social security policy 
shares many normative attributes of a neo-liberal conception of security. Notably, 
that it is 'an individual, an autonomous, private 'security', gained by self-
responsibility through the market: which, by definition, is part of the hazard of the 
ever-changing dynamism of the world' (Culpitt, 1999: 48).  
 
4 It is important to note however, that this contract is not contracted between equal parties, as the terms of the 
contract are liable to change by one party (i.e. the state) at its leisure. The other 'contractee' has nowhere else to 
go to make an alternative contract.  
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Governance in the operational policy domain 
In the context of these changes in the formal policy domain, the logic and goal of the 
associated departmental reorganisation and renaming becomes clear. Taken together, 
the changes represent a new distribution of rights and responsibilities in the 
operational policy domain of governance, which enhance the characteristics of 
governance in the formal policy domain. This new distribution is evident in three 
ways. First, the move of parts of the former DfEE - notably the Employment Service 
- into the newly named DWP reflects the government's constitution of welfare 
subjects by age and labour market status. It also enhances the productivist logic that 
underpins the changes in the formal policy arena. Second, the role of the Treasury 
has changed to become that of a quasi-contractor and monitor of services provided 
through the DWP and its sub-contracting agencies. Third, through the continuing use 
of business models and metaphors, and the emphasis on particular kinds of 
performance measurements and targets as a means to steer the activities of front-line 
DWP staff. 
 
New Departmental structures 
Regarding the first change, the renaming of the DSS into the DWP and its 
reorganisation can be clearly connected to the constitution of welfare subjects in the 
formal policy domain. Thus pensioners are dealt with in the new Pensions Service; 
people of working age are dealt with in the new Jobcentre Plus; benefits for children 
are now primarily delivered through the Inland Revenue. There are some anomalies 
in this formulation, so that the new Pension Credit will also be delivered through the 
Inland Revenue, while a range of benefits will continue to be provided in Jobcentre 
Plus (invalid care allowance, maternity allowance, social fund payments) which do 
not, or do not yet, have work-focused 'responsibilities' attached to them. In addition, 
the Child Support Agency (CSA) continues under the DWP. Nonetheless, the 
departmental renaming, the creation of Jobcentre Plus, and the justifications provided 
for these, make the links to formal policy objectives explicit. 
 
In summer 2000, the then Secretaries of State for the DfEE and DSS (David Blunkett 
and Alastair Darling respectively) appeared together before the relevant House of 
Commons select committees to explain the proposed reorganisation. Darling argued 
that 'we need to change the whole culture of the organisation just as we are changing 
the whole culture of the benefits system' while Blunkett referred to the need to 
overcome the invalid distinction between working age benefit claimants who were 
looking for work and those who were not. The aim in the agency was to 'expand the 
pool of employable people' (Select Committee, 2000b). The process of 'building a 
new culture of work first' (HM Treasury and DWP, 2001: 1.21) required action to 
steer the behaviour of DWP staff in order to change the culture of the DSS/DWP 
itself. Thus the new agency 'will have a new culture, based on helping people to 
become independent, and will help further to embed a culture of responsibilities and 
rights within the welfare system' (DWP, 2002: 16). 
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The move of the Employment Service into the DWP, to be integrated in Jobcentre 
Plus as the latter is extended nationally in 2003, however, strikingly reveals the 
productivist vision in the new social security governance. The Employment Service 
had two sets of clients - 'jobseekers' and employers. As employers are integrated into 
the DWP's set of clients, a different emphasis is introduced into the DWP's services 
for people of working age. The goals of Jobcentre Plus (see box 3.2) embrace a 
particular set of rights and responsibilities, different from those of the DSS. In 
consequence to the integration of the former employment service with the benefits 
agency, the department must now explicitly meet the needs of employers (see also 
Chapter 10 here).  
 
[insert box 3.2 about here]  
 
Jobcentre Plus aims to meet employers’ needs more effectively so that 'planning, 
provision and delivery are geared towards employers’ recruitment needs' (DWP, 
2002: 53; also 12, 15). Filling the 'gaps' in this sentence offers an interesting light on 
the role of the new agency: provision and delivery require a product to be provided 
and delivered. It seems in this case that the 'product' is work-ready, employable 
benefit claimants. Hence these operational policy changes, and the logics of 
behaviour that they induce, suggest that even greater emphasis is placed on the 
creation of employability amongst claimants than might be assessed from analysing 
formal policy. The DWP has gained a new responsibility in respect of maintaining 
the economy. 'It will be important that everyone; employers, individuals and the 
Government, take seriously their responsibility to deliver a high skill, high 
productivity economy' (HM Treasury and DWP, 2001: 4.47, also 4.40).  
 
The role of the Treasury 
The second set of changes in the operational policy domain concerns the role of the 
Treasury. The Treasury has famously been the most powerful single department in 
British policy making for many years (e.g. Hennessy 1989). However, in the past, its 
power over other departments and ministers has primarily been exercised through 
annual budget negotiations, about how much money a department might need or get 
in order to implement its agenda and meet government commitments. At first sight, 
then, the decision of Chancellor Gordon Brown early in the New Labour 
government's first term to initiate a 'Comprehensive Spending Review' (CSR) which 
would establish spending requirements and budgets over a three year period, rather 
than annually, might suggest that departments would gain greater control over their 
spending across this three year period. Certainly as departments are granted under 
this regime greater leeway to 'carry over' unspent money to the next period, this 
appeared to offer departments greater flexibility and predictability in financing 
policy initiatives. This was certainly the case made by the Treasury itself (HM 
Treasury 2000).  
 
 
 
10
                                                     
However, as part of the CSR, departments were required to draw up, in conjunction 
with the Treasury, a 'Public Service Agreement' (PSA). The PSAs set out individual 
departments' policy objectives for the following three years. At the time of writing, 
the most recent PSAs were published in 2000, for the years 2001-4, although a new 
set were to be agreed by autumn 2002. Public Service Agreements were also 
supplemented by Service Delivery Agreements (SDA), a second set of agreements, 
in which departments were required to specify how their policy objectives would be 
met. These were then also supplemented, in the 2000 round of agreements, by 
'technical notes', which further specified the indicators against which departmental 
performance would be measured (e.g. DSS, 2000a),5 and on which the department 
would have to report annually.  
 
This series of 'quasi-contracts' is of profound importance, not only for social security 
governance, but also more widely. Thus Rouse and Smith (2002: 49) are correct to 
argue that PSAs 'have centralised the importance of performance (…) by requiring 
accountable contracts from public service providers'. However, at the same time, 
these authors suggest that these developments permit public service agencies greater 
freedom than under the previous managerialist regime to shape their approach to 
problems or issues (Rouse and Smith, 2002: 48). Certainly it seems possible that 
institutions may be able to shape some aspects of governance in this framework, and 
may, consciously or otherwise, subvert the objectives established in PSAs and SDAs, 
as has occurred in previous managerialist regimes (Clark and Newman 1997). 
However, the claim of greater freedom for agencies under New Labour than under 
the Conservative regime appears to miss the key consequence of these new 
arrangements, and does not account for the context in which the new governance 
regime has developed. The new agreements substantially change the degree to which 
the Treasury is able to set not only the constraints for departments' policymaking, as 
in the past, but also what policies are to be made. The policy objectives themselves, 
how policies are delivered, and how that delivery is to be measured must all now be 
subject to Treasury approval and monitoring.  
5 The technical note for the DWP's 2001-4 PSA is available, as indicated in the bibliography, on the department's 
website, as is the PSA itself. However, the technical note seems not to have been updated to reflect the 
department's change of name, so is listed as 'Department of Social Security (2000)'. The PSA itself, however, has 
had its reference and Internet links updated, and so is listed under Department for Work Pensions, and rather 
confusingly, as 2001, not 2000. The two documents however, do refer to the same agreement, applying to the 
same three-year period of 2001-4. 
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This involves a micro-level scrutiny of departmental actions and institutions, and 
intrusion into departmental autonomy unprecedented in Britain. It is also perhaps 
worth remembering that in these 'contractual' negotiations, the terms and conditions 
of this contract can largely be established by the Treasury, as it still guards access to 
funds, which departments need.6 Indeed, the Treasury in these negotiations still 
places emphasis on what in the Modernising Government White Paper was called 
'earned autonomy' (Cabinet Office, 1999). That is, that departments, agencies, local 
authorities, schools and hospital trusts which met the government's objectives would 
be subject to fewer constraints, while sanctions and threats would be exerted on the 
unsuccessful - as measured by performance targets (Cutler and Waine 2000: 55-6; 
Newman 2001: 91-3). A key moment in the governance of social security then is the 
establishment of these criteria - the objectives of policy - and it is in this process that 
the Treasury has gained unprecedented powers over social security governance. 
 
Contractualism within government: performance management 
The changing role of the Treasury then, demonstrates a shift of responsibilities and 
rights in the operational policy domain, between it and the DWP. However, 
contractualisation extends far beyond that of PSAs and SDAs. Ever since the 
introduction of the Benefits and Child Support Agency, and indeed agencies in other 
government departments from the late 1980s onwards, mechanisms have been 
required in order to exert control of this process of 'agencification' (Rhodes 1997). 
This was done through framework agreements with the agencies delivering policy, 
audit of the services provided, and the use of performance management imported 
from the private sector (Rose 1996b; Clarke and Newman 1997). In addition to these 
arrangements - for what might be called departmental sub-contractors for policy 
delivery - contracts and framework agreements are also developed for the private and 
voluntary sector organisations that now run some Jobcentre plus offices. 
Furthermore, additional 'partnership working' between the Pensions Service and 
other organisations dealing with the over 65s is planned (DWP 2001c), for which we 
can perhaps expect more 'service level agreements' to establish the responsibilities of 
relevant parties, similar to those already established with local authorities (e.g. 
Benefits Agency, 2002: 20). 
 
Given the extent of this contractualisation, the emphasis on performance 
management in meeting policy objectives in New Labour governance generally has 
been described as 'a liberal dose of accountability through accountancy' Massey 
(2001: 31). That is, audits are used as a means of comptrol - i.e. financial control - to 
assess service delivery and organisational responsibilities. To view the maintenance 
and creation of accountability as solely through accountancy is, however, too narrow. 
Indeed the New Labour government can be distinguished from its predecessors 
6 It is possible to imagine cases where departments have a stronger hand - for example in pursuing a policy 
initiative with the express patronage of the Prime Minister, or where a minister has powerful political support for 
their personal agenda which the Chancellor is unable to threaten. And of course, the Prime Minister has the 
technical capacity to remove the Chancellor, which might act as a threat. At the moment however, such a radical 
step seems politically unfeasible, and as practiced in the DWP, the PSAs and SDAs appear to confirm a 
remarkable congruence between the Treasury's agenda and that of the successive Secretaries of State.  
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precisely on this point. If the previous governments were concerned with cost, 
efficiency and value for money (Newman, 2001: 91), the first two terms of the Blair 
government have ushered in a performative managerialism, characterised by a 
'developmental approach'. In contrast to the previous governments, this approach is 
outcome and objective oriented, primarily concerned with achieving particular 
outcomes with the money that is spent (Rouse and Smith, 2002: 47). This approach 
was articulated in both the 1999 Modernising Government White Paper (Cabinet 
Office, 1999) and the review of the Paper’s impact and implementation (Centre for 
Management and Policy Studies 2001). In Box 3.3, what was described by the 
government as 'the nine features of modern policymaking' (ibid, p.14) are shown. 
The characteristics of this outcome-oriented, performative management are 
demonstrated in the importance of objective and outcomes in points one, three and 
six. In addition, under points six to nine, it is clear that implementation, and control 
of implementation directed towards the achievement of objectives, is central to New 
Labour’s operational policy strategy.  
  
[insert box 3.3 about here] 
 
A wide array of government - as opposed to parliamentary - performance 
measurement and review mechanisms to identify and assess the achievement of these 
objectives has been adopted. These range from the Audit Office to no less than ten 
different processes or review groups and institutions operating under the umbrellas of 
the Cabinet Office and Treasury (see Table 3.1). Furthermore, these mechanisms are 
additional to those instituted by the department to evaluate agency and service 
performance, such as annual reports and oversight bodies. In turn, these have been 
supplemented by micro-performance management such as 'Performance 
Improvement Teams' which investigated and publicised best practice in the Benefits 
Agency; the encouragement of 'customer service managers' to engage in performance 
evaluation procedures; and the creation of dedicated 'absentee' managers to monitor 
staff attendance (Benefits Agency, 2002: 32-3, 18, 44).  
 
Yet, as Cutler and Waine (2000: 52-3) point out, the close specification of targets 
and indicators are likely to stifle innovation and interfere with the development of 
'joined-up government'. Staff at all levels can become oriented towards completing, 
or seeming as if they are completing, such targets; or they focus on complying with 
procedures at the expense of programme aims (Newman, 2001: 93). Indeed, meeting 
these multiple targets can involve contradictory tendencies which are not easily 
reconcilable for front-line staff, especially when they involve both sets of Jobcentre 
Plus ‘customers’ – employers and claimants as discussed in Chapter 11.  
 
[insert Table 3.1 about here] 
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The dominance of the' business model' 
One other feature of policymaking from Box 3.3 deserves attention, in terms of what 
it reveals about the dominance of 'business'-style models and metaphors in social 
security governance. Feature five concerns the inclusion of non-governmental actors 
both 'front-line' staff, and those on whom services impact, regarding the development 
of policies. The DWP, however, does not appear to have engaged in this process; as 
Lister (2001: 106) points out, there is little or no evidence of service-user 
involvement in deciding how services are delivered (see also Chapter 10 here). It is 
certainly the case that numerous reviews and evaluations of social security policies 
have been conducted under this plan, but such evaluations often treat service users as 
customers, in which the socio-political character of state-provided services is glossed 
over. After all, one adage of customer service in the private sector is that the 
customer is king or queen: this seems a perverse reading of the highly conditional 
'new contract' analysed in the previous section of this chapter. Yet, this contradictory 
construction of benefit claimants as customers, and of agencies and even the 
department, as businesses is inescapable in documents discussing service delivery 
(e.g. DWP, 2002; Benefits Agency, 2002; Darling in Social Security Select 
Committee, 2000). Thus, the intention in Jobcentre Plus is to ensure that 'the service 
is customer-focused and tailored to individual needs' (DWP 2001c: 7) and that teams 
of staff in the Pensions Service 'manage and support the entire customer experience', 
'delivering the best customer experience' (DWP, 2001/2: 3).  
 
Many of the measures introduced under such claims certainly seem likely to improve 
the experience of claiming benefit: unscreened offices; the ability to initiate a claim 
over the telephone; avoiding the need to go to more than one office when claiming 
different benefits. Others seem more spuriously related to claimants needs, so that 
the provision of Internet and email-based services for precisely those people least 
likely to have access to such facilities does not seem to offer a particularly improved 
'customer experience' (Selwyn 2002, Chapter 13 here).  
 
From a governance perspective, however, a more significant point can be raised with 
regard to these measures. Their justification is not dependent on the characterisation 
of claimants as ‘customers’ to make sense so that, for example, one could justify 
such changes on the basis of the needs of claimants. In this case, then, the choice to 
constitute claimants as customers is less concerned with claimants' status than with 
steering the behaviour of staff to perform their work 'as if' claimants were customers 
and they part of an entrepreneurial and profit-seeking 'business'. The importation of 
business models of performance management is made to make sense by considering 
the role of everyone in the department to be oriented towards the business-style goals 
of customer service, and, of course, product delivery. 
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Conclusion: The new governance of social security  
This chapter has explored the policy principles, objectives and intended outputs of 
the Labour government, and the organisational arrangements and procedures for 
policy delivery. In both domains we can observe a quasi-'contractualisation' of social 
security: between the Department's policymakers and the Treasury, between service 
providers and the Department and, last but no means least, between the individual 
benefit recipient and the Department. Furthermore, it was argued that under this new 
form of governance, individuals and social groups are steered to act as 'risk and 
opportunity-takers' and entrepreneurs.  
 
In terms of its formal content, social security policy for all people of working age has 
been transformed to serve labour market policy objectives; that is, a means with 
which to manage labour market behaviour. It is only with regard to policies for 
children that we can see a commitment to socio-economic security, although this is 
now primarily delivered through the Treasury. In terms of operational policy, these 
role changes are reflected in the Departmental renaming/reorganisation, as well as in 
the DWP's stated vision and policy objectives. Further, the official use of the term 
social security policy has become less of a descriptor of policies providing socio-
economic security underwritten by the state, but rather a descriptor of policies that 
'encourage' particular kinds of individual behaviour in the face of insecurity.  
 
Thus, the new governance of social security in Britain can be characterised as a new 
form of political regulation in which the DWP and the Treasury construct and ‘steer’ 
social subjects towards a set of socio-economic goals, that are clearly anchored in a 
productivist vision of the role of social security in an internationalised market 
economy. A new distribution of rights, responsibilities and risks for individuals and 
institutions is established through increasing contractualisation of their relationships 
and extensive monitoring of their behaviour and performance. As such, this is a new 
chapter in the history of social security in Britain; a new kind of social security, that 
is not very social and even less secure.  
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▪ 
▪ 
▪ 
Overview 
This chapter analyses social security policy using the concept of ‘governance’. 
The concept is used to describe how the behaviour of individuals, institutions and 
social groups is politically regulated, and steered, to meet socio-economic goals. 
Analysing a form of governance in a policy domain involves the examination of 
both the ‘formal’ and operational aspects of policy making. 
Regarding formal policy, the key principles and goals of social security under the 
Labour government involve a re-definition of the policy content of security from 
protection based on rights, to support based on obligations; a re-constitution of 
welfare subjects predominantly in relation to their labour market status and age; 
the conflation of security with (paid) work; an increase in contractualisation and 
monitoring of claimants’ behaviour accompanied by selective universalism.  
Regarding operational policy, the renaming and reorganisation of the DSS into 
the DWP confirmed the productivist logic associated with formal policy changes, 
with a clear emphasis on labour market integration for all working age benefit 
claimants; an explicit institutional commitment to meet the demands of 
employers; the introduction and extension of ‘business’ discourse and 
performance management in all areas of the Department; and, an unprecedented 
increase of the Treasury’s capacity to control policy making in the DWP.  
 
 
Questions for revision 
1. Explain the distinction between formal and operational policy; how are they 
related in the case of social security? 
2. In what ways do conceptualisations of ‘social security’ differ between the 
Beveridgean ideal and that expressed by the Labour government?  
3. Identify and explain the main changes in social security operational policy since 
1997. Which of these changes is the most significant, and why?  
4. Is it appropriate to talk about benefit claimants and recipients as customers? 
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Box 3.1 
Visions of social security 
 
 
1. Franklin D. Roosevelt  
Message to Congress, June 1934, prior to passing of Social Security Act 1935  
(cited in Digby, 1989, p.16) 
 
Among our objectives I place the security of the men, women and children of the nation first 
[…] People […] want some safeguard against those misfortunes which cannot be wholly 
eliminated in this man-made world of ours. 
 
2. William Beveridge,  
December 1942 Radio interview the day his report was published  
(cited in Fraser, 1984, p.216) 
 
The Plan for Britain is based on the contributory principle of giving not free allowances to 
all from the State, but giving benefits as of right in virtue of contributions made by the 
insured persons themselves 
 
3. The Declaration of Philadelphia,  
1944 - principles of the International Labour Organisation 
 
a) Labour is not a commodity; b) Freedom of expression and of association are essential to 
sustained progress; c) Poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere; d) 
All human beings, irrespective of race, creed, or sex, have the right to pursue both their 
material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of 
economic security, and of equal opportunity [….] peace can be established only if it is based 
on social justice. 
 
3. John Moore, Secretary of State for Social Services,  
Interview in Sunday Times, 28 September 1987 
 
A welfare state worthy of the name aims at the real welfare of its citizens. It works to widen 
the understanding that dependency can be debilitating and that the best kind of help is that 
which gives people the will and ability to help themselves. 
 
4. New Ambitions for Our Country: A New Contract for Welfare.  
Green Paper on Welfare Reform, March 1998 
 
The Government is determined to build an active welfare system which helps people to help 
themselves and ensures a proper level of support in times of need. (p.16) 
 
The new welfare state should help and encourage people of working age to work where they 
are capable of doing so. The government's aim is to rebuild the welfare state around work. 
(p.23) 
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Box 3.2  
Goals of Jobcentre Plus 
 
 a work focus to the benefits system 
 a dedicated service to enable employers to fill their vacancies quickly and 
successfully 
 swift, secure and professional access to benefits 
 a much better service for everyone who needs help 
 active help from Personal Advisors 
 a safer and more professional working environment for staff 
 greatly improved IT accommodation and support services 
 
Source: DWP, 2002, pp.15-6 
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Box 3.3 
The Nine Features of Modern Policymaking 
 
1. Forward-looking: identification of outcomes; accounting for long-term government 
strategy 
2. Outward looking: looks to other countries & policy mechanisms; presentation strategy 
prepared 
3. Innovative, flexible and creative: defines success in terms of outcomes already identified; 
manages risk; team-working; involvement of outsiders on 'policy team' 
4. Evidence-based: commissions research; reviews existing research; consults experts 
5. Inclusive: consults service implementers; those affected by policy; seeks feedback; 
conducts impact assessment 
6. Joined-up: cross-cutting objectives identified at outset; definitions of joint-working 
arrangements; implementation is part of policymaking process 
7. Review: ongoing review programme; meaningful performance indicators; redundant or 
failing policies abandoned 
8. Evaluation: defined purpose for evaluation at outset; success criteria defined; evaluation 
process built in from outset; use of pilots 
9. Learns lessons: dissemination of good practice; account of what was done in response to 
lessons learned; distinction between failure to implement and failures of implementation 
 
Source: Centre for Management and Policy Studies, 2001, p.14 
 
 
 
19
Table 3.1 
Government performance measurement and improvement strategy mechanisms 
 
 
Department 
or Office 
 
Institution  
or Group 
Role 
Audit Office 
 
 Value-for-money; lesson learning 
Treasury Spending reviews Review and evaluation of policy aims and 
budgetary needs/constraints 
 Public Service Agreements 
(PSA) 
Identification of targets for final policy 
outcomes 
 Service Delivery Agreements 
(SDA) 
Clarification of how resources to be 
managed to reach targets 
 SDA regulations Specification of performance indicators for 
each policy objective 
 Public Services Productivity 
Panel 
Review of policy for 'customer focus' 
throughout policy-making; 'self-analysis' 
tools for policymakers to improve 
performance 
 
Cabinet Office Prime Minister's Delivery Unit Monitoring to ensure government meets 
objectives in priority policy areas]. Includes 
private sector staff. 
 Office for Public Service 
Reform 
Review of public and civil services reform  
 Performance and Innovation 
Unit 
'Big Issues' work on forecasting and 
strategic thinking 
 Centre for Management and 
Policy Studies 
Training and development; best practice 
dissemination; promotion of evidence-based 
policy & excellent policy research 
 Public sector benchmarking 
project 
Transfer of 'Business Excellence Model' of 
benchmarking for comparing public/public 
and public/private sector performance 
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